High density high rise vertical living for low income people in Colombo, Sri Lanka:Learning from Pruitt-Igoe by Samaratunga, Thushara & O'Hare, Daniel
Bond University
Research Repository
High density high rise vertical living for low income people in Colombo, Sri Lanka
Samaratunga, Thushara; O'Hare, Daniel
Published in:
Architecture Research
DOI:
10.5923/j.arch.20120206.03
Published: 01/01/2012
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Samaratunga, T., & O'Hare, D. (2012). High density high rise vertical living for low income people in Colombo,
Sri Lanka: Learning from Pruitt-Igoe. Architecture Research, 2(6), 128-133.
https://doi.org/10.5923/j.arch.20120206.03
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 10 May 2019
Bond University
ePublications@bond
Mirvac School of Sustainable Development Institute of Sustainable Development andArchitecture
1-1-2012
High density high rise vertical living for low income
people in Colombo, Sri Lanka: Learning from
Pruitt-Igoe
Thushara Samaratunga
Bond University, Thushara_Samaratunga@bond.edu.au
Daniel O'Hare
Bond University, daniel_o'hare@bond.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/sustainable_development
Part of the Architecture Commons, and the Sustainability Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you by the Institute of Sustainable Development and Architecture at ePublications@bond. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mirvac School of Sustainable Development by an authorized administrator of ePublications@bond. For more information, please contact
Bond University's Repository Coordinator.
Recommended Citation
Thushara Samaratunga and Daniel O'Hare. (2012) "High density high rise vertical living for low
income people in Colombo, Sri Lanka: Learning from Pruitt-Igoe" Architecture Research, 2 (6) ,
128-133.
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/sustainable_development/175
Architecture Research 2012, 2(6): 128-133 
DOI: 10.5923/j.arch.20120206.03  
 
High Density High Rise Vertical Living for Low Income 
People in Colombo, Sri Lanka: Learning from Pruitt-Igoe 
Thushara Samaratunga*, Daniel O'Hare 
Institute of Sustainable Development and Architecture Bond University, Australia 
 
Abstract  The Colombo Master Plan (2008) reveals that there are 66,000 households within the City of Colombo living in 
squalid slums and shanties unfit for human habitation. They represent 51 per cent of the total city population, and live in 
1,506 pockets of human concentration identified as Under Served Settlements (USS) encumbering on state owned lands with 
no title. About 390 hectares of valuable prime lands in the City have succumbed to the encroachment process during the past 
five decades. Moreover they have engulfed all the environmentally sensitive low lying areas, canal banks and flood retention 
areas as well as roads, railway  reservations and other open spaces. Since gaining independence in 1948, the Sri Lankan 
government has devoted much attention to finding a solution for this situation and has successively introduced policies, 
programs and projects to overcome poor housing in Colombo. However, most of these programs have proven to be only 
temporary fixes, and have not made any significant long-term impact to the housing sector overall. Th is research paper 
discusses the Sri Lankan government’s policy move towards high-rise high-density low income public housing as an 
appropriate solution for slums and shanties in Colombo City. It is noted that high-rise housing for low income people is not a 
universally accepted solution for housing for low income people and some countries have totally rejected h igh-rise for low 
income housing due to significant failures in the past. At the same time, some other countries claim success in high-rise 
housing for low income people including uplifting low income people to a midd le income status through high rise housing. 
Therefore high-rise low income housing remains a controversial topic in many developed and developing countries. This 
paper revisits the literature on Pruitt-Igoe in order to identify lessons that may assist Sri Lankan  authorities to avoid similar 
failures.    
Keywords  High-Rise Housing, High-Density Housing, Low Income Housing, Low Income High-Rise Housing, Public 
Housing, Pruitt-Igoe, Urban Development Authority, Colombo 
 
1. Introduction 
The Colombo Master Plan (2008) reveals that there are 
66,000 households within the City  of Colombo liv ing in 
squalid slums and shanties unfit for human  habitation. They 
represent 51 per cent of the total city population, and live in 
1,506 pockets of human concentration identified as Under 
Served Sett lements (USS) encumbering  on state owned 
lands with no title . About 390 hectares of valuable prime 
lands in  the City  have succumbed  to  the encroachment 
process during the past five decades. Moreover they have 
engulfed all the environmentally sensitive low ly ing areas, 
canal banks and flood retention  areas as well as roads, 
railway reservations and other open spaces. Since gaining 
independence in  1948, the Sri Lankan  government  has 
devoted much attention to finding  a solution for th is situation 
and has successively  introduced po licies, p rograms  and  
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projects to overcome poor housing in Colombo. However, 
most of these programs have proven to be only temporary 
fixes, and have not made any significant long-term impact to 
the housing sector overall 
Until the year 2001, high-rise low-income housing 
(structures above five storeys) was not on the Sri Lankan 
government’s urban planning agenda. Since then, the 
government has attempted to convince urban slum dwellers 
to relocate to nearby high-rise apartments and, thus, reclaim 
valuable land inhabited by informal low-income settlements 
in Colombo city. The “Sahaspura” high-rise low-income 
housing project was the first attempt in this direction and it 
consisted of 14 floors with 670 housing units in 2001. In 
practice, this concept has been limited to one project, 
Sahaspura, and no more developments were proposed until 
the end of the civil war in 2009. However, since the after end 
of the civil war in 2009, the Sri Lankan government has 
given priority to city development, especially in Colombo as 
it is the commercial capital of the country. The main 
constraint to Colombo urban and economic development 
was that 51 per cent of the city’s population live in 
under-served settlements. The alternative considered best by 
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Colombo urban planners was to implement a high-rise 
high-density vertical housing strategy, which was begun in 
2001 with the “Sahaspura” project. At the time of writing 
this paper, nearly 12,000 high rise housing units are 
commencing with a goal to construct 35,000 dwellings 
within the next three years[1]. 
Sri Lankan housing professionals and policy-makers have 
mixed feelings about adopting high-rise low-income housing 
in Colombo. Lack of literature and research are the main 
impediment in the field and Colombo City needs more 
academic research to discover what the main  factors are in 
the success or failures of low-income housing, especially 
high-rise low-income housing. Even though high-rise 
low-income housing is new for Sri Lanka, it is not new for 
many other countries in the world. Therefore, the knowledge 
gained from international experience and critical evaluation 
of past experiences, would be very beneficial for Sri Lankan 
high-rise housing. 
The Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St Louis, US is 
one of the most discussed public housing projects as well as a 
symbolic icon and the most well-known case study, which 
ended in the demolit ion of 2,800 housing units[2]. There is a 
correlation between the Pruitt-Igoe case and the current 
Colombo high-rise low-income housing program entitled 
Relocation of Underserved Settlements, in that the main aim 
of both projects was slum clearance by providing high-rise 
housing for the urban poor. Therefore, understanding the 
Pruitt-Igoe experience is extremely important for Sri Lankan 
professionals and policy-makers to reduce the risk and not 
repeat the same mistake in developing high-rise low-income 
housing in Sri Lanka.  
 
Figure 1.  Pruitt-Igoe high-rise public housing Project[15] 
 
Figure 2.  “Sahaspura” Low income housing Project[14] 
2. Main Issues Associated with High 
Rise Low Income Housing  
In critically  evaluating the Pru itt-Igoe public housing 
project and other well-known h igh-rise public housing 
projects, it is clear that most issues fall into four main 
categories:  
1) Social and cultural issues; 
2) Architectural, p lanning and technical issues;  
3) Financial issues; and 
4) Management and operational issues.  
The success or failure of high-rise low-income housing 
depends on how these four sectors are managed and 
mitigated. After the high-profile  failure of the Pruitt-Igoe 
public housing scheme, most housing professionals 
considered high-rise public housing no longer an option in 
the US. Therefore, to understand the issues surrounding 
high-rise low-income housing, it is worthwhile to conduct an 
in-depth evaluation of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project with 
comparison of how social and cu ltural issues, architectural 
planning and technical issues, financial issues and 
management and operational issues affected this project.  
Pruitt-Igoe was a large public housing project built in  
1954 on a 57-acre site  in  St  Louis, comprising of 33 
eleven-floor build ings which would house over 2,800 
apartments. The complex was designed by well-known 
architect Minoru Yamasaki, who also designed the World 
Trade Centre in New York. Pru itt–Igoe was a critically 
acclaimed  design and in 1951 the Architectural Forum gave 
Pruitt–Igoe an award  as the ‘the best high-rise apartment’ of 
the year[2]. Pruitt–Igoe was styled as a project that followed 
the principles of Le Corbusier’s concept in modern 
architecture. Although crit icis ms of inadequate parking and a 
lack of recreation facilit ies were levelled at this project, no 
one anticipated Pruitt–Igoe would become a symbolic failu re 
in the public housing sector[3].  
Shortly after its completion, this award-winning pro ject 
began its decline. The project had failed on an architectural 
and social level. Maintenance and many other qualitative 
features proved to be expensive and difficu lt to upkeep. In 
1972, state and federal authorities decided to demolish the 
$57 million investment project, making it the b iggest disaster 
in high-rise public housing history[2].  
What went wrong with Pruitt–Igoe? The exp lanation for 
the spectacular failure is complex. Many people believe it 
was purely architectural failure and the construction did not 
meet the needs of the city or its residents. Other crit ics bring 
in social factors, such as a lack of shared space to create 
community feeling and the lack of recreational areas. Some 
argue poor maintenance and management caused the 
building to fall into disrepair. However, no single reason 
could cause such a huge disaster, and the most common 
theory is that several mistakes were made throughout the 
project. According to Cohn (2005), Architectural social, 
management and policy issues equally led to the qualitative 
decline and kept people out of the project.  
3. Architectural Planning and Technical 
Issues 
Pruitt-Igoe is famous among architects because its 
demolition was heralded as the death of modern architecture, 
and it came to symbolize a general loss of faith in arch itects’ 
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abilities to design a solution to problems in general and 
high-rise public housing in particular[4 , 5]. Prominent urban 
planner Oscar Newman stated that “Architects love to build 
high-rise buildings because that’s what impresses other 
architects[and] most architects give priority to their personal 
goals rather than the real requirements of the pro ject”[6]. The 
dialogue around iconic build ings and large-scale projects 
generates direct and indirect popularity for the architect. 
With Pruitt–Igoe, the initial proposal for a mix of high-rise, 
mid-rise and walk-up buildings, but the final result was 33 
buildings, each with eleven floors – a considerably denser 
housing scheme[5].  
Thomas P. Costello, the former director of the St Louis 
Housing Authority, said in an interview "The entire public 
housing program was always geared to production, not to 
providing decent housing for poor people"[6]. Costello 
believed that badly designed high-rise build ings, like those at 
Pruitt-Igoe, “virtually guaranteed failure”[6]. 
Technical failu res and the negative attitudes of the 
architects also had a very bad impact on public housing in 
this era. O’Neill[7] states “most of the architects who plan 
public housing for low-income people d idn’t really care 
about the people who were going to live in it. The public’s 
image was they were just considered poor, illiterate people, 
so the attitude was, ‘Let’s put them all in one p lace, in these 
huge buildings, and just let the damned things go’[7]. That 
statement rings especially true in context of the Sri Lankan 
low-income housing, as governments tend to think only in 
terms of literal improvement of living space, believing is it 
enough to uplift the liv ing condition and social life of the 
urban poor. For example, in “Sahaspura” the minimum unit 
size is 35 square metres, which is not much space for an 
entire family  and their amenities. However as the family’s 
previous dwellings in the slums likely consisted  of a space 
smaller than 35 square metres without any amenities, it is an 
improvement[8]. 
According to Cohn[6], there are common features to 
high-rise public housing that mean it will not wear well over 
time. Some examples of these features are poor maintenance, 
the regular breakdown of elevators, a low-cost design, a lack 
of insulation to prevent excesses of heat and cold, a lack of 
open space and landscaping as well as isolation of 
individuals due to a lack of common space. Furthermore, if 
an area consists of only low-income people, then it will be 
labelled as ‘a place where the poor people are living’[6]. The 
Pruitt-Igoe development experienced all of the 
above-mentioned weaknesses, and they have been very 
common in most low-income housing projects in Sri  
Lanka.  
Location is another issue in many public housing projects. 
Planners tend to propose poor and isolated areas for public 
housing. Considering the land value and demand, locating 
public housing far from the city center is much cheaper and 
can reduce the cost of the project. Pruitt-Igoe, although 
located relat ively close to downtown St  Louis, was located in 
an area  demarcated as a poor residential area. Fortunately, 
Sri Lankan urban planners have avoided locational mistakes 
by attempting to provide low-income housing near to the 
CBD and other workplaces. The best examples are 
Gunasinghe Pura Flat, just five minutes walking distance 
from the CBD; Central Sat ion Kotahena Flats, five minutes 
walking distance from the Colombo Harbour; and 
Maligawatha Flat, which is 10 minutes walking distance to 
the railway yards and industrial areas. In addtion Sahaspura, 
Sri Lanka’s first high-rise low-income housing project, is 
also located at the centre of the city. Prime location is one of 
the main strengths in Colombo low-income housing, and 
even though low-income housing tends to have minimal 
facilit ies and amenities, no project has resulted in demolition 
or mass vacancies like Pruitt-Igoe. 
Somet imes implementing innovative ideas and 
experiments also leads to a bad result for high-rise build ings. 
Pruitt-Igoe's recreational galleries and skip-stop elevators, 
once heralded as architectural innovations, became 
nuisances and danger zones[3]. From an environmental and 
sustainability point of v iew, the skip-stop elevator is a 
creative way to protect the environment and reduce 
electricity consumption. From a health point of v iew, 
reducing where elevators can stop encourages people to walk 
and climb stairs, thus receiving beneficial incidental exercise. 
However, a skip-stop elevator causes enormous difficulty to 
elderly people, sick people or those with a disability, 
pregnant woman and parents with small children – the very 
people who are often concentrated in low-income housing. 
Unfortunately, the same thing happened in Sahaspura when 
the Sri Lankan architects also incorrectly  assumed that 
having galleries would help  promote community interaction 
in what was bound to be a harsh social environment, and so 
the lift only operated above the fifth floor. Today, these huge 
corridors are the most difficu lt part to maintain and that 
unnecessary communal space could have been added to 
residential units for the same cost. Fortunately, the Sri 
Lankan  architects did not structurally restrict the elevators, 
but simply manually restricted usage up to the fourth level. 
Therefore those people who need the elevator can obtain 
special permission to use it when they need[9], and  
elevator management p rocesses can be reviewed in the 
future. 
4. Social Issues 
The Pruitt-Igoe development made several mistakes in the 
social aspect of the project from the very  beginning. Basic 
design negligence can cause massive damage to the    
entire social lives of the people who live in the project. 
Hoffman[5] said “The Pru itt-Igoe structures were very 
successful, but the designers ignored the very basic social 
requirements”. 
Regardless of income level, racial desegregation was 
another social issue in Pru itt-Igoe. Orig inally Pruitt-Igoe was 
conceived as two segregated sections, with Pruitt for blacks 
and Igoe for whites. However, attempts at integration failed 
and Pruitt-Igoe became an exclusively black project[2], with 
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stigma arising from the negative social perception of the 
project as a poor black project. In Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
ethnic and relig ious diversification is not a big problem. 
Despite this, social recognition can be very negative and with 
a perception that low-income people who live low-income 
housing are ‘looked down upon’ and lack privilege in the 
city[9]. 
Critics claim that another mistake made in Pru itt-Igoe was 
to house many people in too little space, without easy access 
to the world beyond the site[6]. Sociologists were warning of 
the dangers of isolating the poor in dehumanising structures, 
even as the US push for high-rise public housing got 
underway in the early 1950s[2]. A similar situation is 
currently occurring in Sri Lanka. Following the end of the 30 
years civil war, planners and the Colombo City authority are 
attempting to build as many  high-rise low-income housing 
units as possible in a limited area to clear the slums in the city. 
As with the US public housing push of the 1950s, Sri Lankan 
urban planners and policy-makers often pay more attention 
to housing production than to the social issues. If Sri Lankan 
policy-makers do not learn lessons from past unsuccessful 
examples of isolated high-density low-income housing, 
similar failures could happen in Colombo. 
Further social issues such as vandalism, illegal business, 
violence, drugs and organized crime also contributed to the 
failure of the Pru itt-Igoe development[2,6]. These types of 
social issues are not uncommon in slums and when slum 
dwellers relocate to the high-rises, they bring their existing 
social issues with them. Therefore, planners should be aware 
of this problem and avoid placing thousands of slum 
dwellers in  one place, thus reducing their vulnerab ility to 
crime and creating a safe environment.  
In the 1980s the Max Plank Institute in Germany received 
funding from the European Union to establish the 
relationship between high-rise low-income housing and 
vulnerability to crime, focusing on whether this problem of 
crime has something to do with the design and construction 
of high-rise housing or whether it is to do with broader social 
and demographic factors[10]. The research found that crime 
and a decrease in the quality of life is not limited to high-rise 
buildings and that physical security and design 
improvements aimed at  crime reduction alone will not in 
themselves guarantee a safer environment. Community 
safety is reliant more on socioeconomic conditions, 
community cohesion, demographic and estate management 
factors. Good design and appropriate levels of security can 
provide the setting for a better quality of life for residents of 
high-rise housing[10].  
 
1996                1999             2011 
Figure 3.  “Sahaspura” Before, and After[14] 
5. Management and Maintenance Issues 
Experiences with the management and maintenance of 
high-rises in  the past have shown that high-rise housing is 
difficult and complicated to manage, whether privately 
owned, government owned or belonging to a housing 
association. High-rise housing often shares too many 
facilit ies and amenities including public spaces, lifts, 
combined electricity and water networks, but lacks clear 
allocation of responsibility for the maintenance, 
management and cleanliness of the building. Therefore 
having a management corporation is essential for 
undertaking the management and maintenance of the 
building. It is vital that the management body has sufficient 
funds to keep the building in a good manner. Privately 
owned luxury high-rise apartment buildings have their own 
mechanis m to maintain the building which  includes adequate 
funding, but it more complicated when it comes to 
low-income high-rise housing. Poor maintenance is one of 
the biggest contributors to the deterioration of high-rise 
buildings and low-income housing associations often have 
litt le or no money to undertake regular maintenance. With 
the Pruitt-Igoe housing project, a  decline of the occupancy 
rate and a difficu lty in collecting rent from very low-income 
residents resulted in a reduction of the funds available for 
maintenance, which  led  to a decline in  the quality o f the 
building which in turn discouraged people from moving into 
the building. This situation is very common in Sri Lankan 
low-income housing where no one has taken responsibility 
for the maintenance of low-income housing. Low-income 
house-owners believe it is the responsibility of the 
government or city council and blame the government and 
city council for the deteriorat ion of the build ing. The 
previous Sri Lankan government did not establish a 
requirement to have a management corporation for 
low-income housing projects and all maintenance was done 
by the Common Amenity Board in the Housing Ministry. 
However, this system has been changed since the Sahaspura 
project and now it  is a  legal requirement to establish a 
management corporation responsible for taking care of the 
building and supporting the residents of new high-rise 
low-income housing projects. However, even with a 
compulsory management corporation, raising funds is still 
critical.  
This problem is not exclusive to  Pru itt-Igoe and Sri Lanka. 
It is a  very common scenario for low-income high-rises 
around the world. Extensive research and critical dialogue 
has been done on this issue and a range of possible solutions 
exist. According to Daheragoda[11]: 
Renovation of high-rise low-income housing[in Sri Lanka] 
is often less expensive than building new housing. Most 
forms of low-income housing are difficult to manage. This, 
however, does not mean that there are no solutions at hand. 
The key is to be more creative, allow for more input from 
those who live in these developments and have experienced 
these problems first hand, and not seek to implement a single 
‘successful’ model in all cases[11]. 
 Thushara Samaratunga et al.:  High Density High Rise Vertical Living for Low  132 
Income People in Colombo, Sri Lanka: Learning from Pruitt-Igoe 
 
6. Financial Issues  
Mary K. Nenno, the Associate Director of the National 
Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials in the 
1950s, stated that "The construction of high-rise public 
housing was to a large extent a response to cost pressures…. 
The federal government wanted to get as many units on a site 
as was humanly  possible –  not only because it would be 
cheaper to build  per un it, but also because it would  be 
cheaper to operate once it was built and would mean more 
rental income coming in”[6,12]. Accordingly, it was clear 
that under the urban renewal and slum clearance pro jects of 
the 1950s, the housing authority target was to provide as 
many units as possible for low-income families with a 
limited budget. Budget restrictions were one of the main 
reason changing the original proposal of Pru itt-Igoe, which 
was a mix o f h igh and low density housing projects, to only 
high-density 11-storeyed housing. The Pruitt-Igoe project 
was also severely restricted by cost-cutting as an attempt to 
reduce costs from the original budget. The cost-cutting 
limited the arch itects and forced them to change the original 
designs. Several changes were made to the design of the 
Pruitt-Igoe public housing, for example elevators and 
corridors were constructed on the outside of most buildings 
and cheap material and poor-quality finishes were used. 
Additionally, to save money on doorways, elevators were 
designed to stop only on every third floor, and while the 
elevators and hallways constructed along the outside of 
buildings may have reduced initial costs, they also virtually 
ensured there would  be maintenance problems. This 
post-concept reduction of construction costs also happened 
in Colombo while developing its high-rise low-income 
housing. The government wanted to min imise the cost of 
housing while building as many units as possible within a 
limited budget. In Sahaspura, the initial min imum unit size 
was 45 square metres. This area was reduced to 35 square 
metres due to the huge cost pressure and to increase the 
number of units.  
Currently the Sri Lankan government plans to construct 
66,000 high-rise housing units in Colombo to relocate the 
residents of under-served settlements in the city. This is the 
biggest relocation programme in the country’s history and 
the estimated budget is LKR 2.5 million per unit 
(AU$24,000).  
Gotabaya Rajapaksha[13], the Secretary of the Ministry of 
Defence and Urban Development in Sri Lanka and the key 
person in the relocation of under-served settlement program, 
during a speech on World Town Planning Day (2010), 
highlighted that: 
At least Rs 2.5 million is required to resettle one of these 
families at a small housing unit. We have to find money to 
relocate these families. Town p lanning comes in here. Town 
planning should be realistic and town planners have a big 
challenge while doing this[13] 
His statement makes clear he believes that cost is the main  
challenge for low-income housing and he asks city planners 
to find the way to generate funds through city planning and 
to ask how innovative planning can reduce the cost of the 
project.  
7. Conclusions 
Housing is the most difficu lt basic need to fulfil 
worldwide, with millions of people liv ing without habitable 
housing. This situation is severe in  Asia and it  is getting 
worse in urban areas such as Colombo, Sri Lanka. Therefore, 
it is an urgent requirement to develop a practical mechanism 
to address this issue. Throughout history successive Sri 
Lankan governments have chosen different strategies to 
overcome the problem of a shortage of habitable housing for 
the poor. High rise is one option selected by the Sri Lankan 
government to address the housing issues for low income 
people in Colombo City.  
However, h igh-rise low-income housing is a controversial 
option, and even in this case study of Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
there are examples of successful and unsuccessful high-rise 
low-income housing as well as low-rise low-income housing. 
However, there is a lack of literature that focuses on Sri 
Lanka and little research has been done in this field. Without 
extensive and in-depth evaluation of local and international 
experiences of high-rise low-income housing, the Sri Lankan 
government has made a policy decision to build  66,000 
housing units in high-rise within the next six years[1]. At the 
time of writing, 12,000 housing units are being built and 
millions of Rupees are being spending on this project by the 
Urban Development Authority for the wellbeing of the city. 
The primary aim of this paper is to critically evaluate some 
international and local experiences in high rise low income 
housing and thus increase the knowledge base for when 
building houses for the 51 per cent of the Colombo 
population who are low-income people and need new, high 
density housing. The discussion in this paper provides 
support for the argument that “the Pru itt-Igoe myth”[2] holds 
lessons that remain relevant half a century later. 
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